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ABSTRACT
This study aims to investigate the direct relationship between 
precautionary cash holdings, cash low volatility and the inancial 
constraints of Pakistani irms for the period 2003–2013.The study 
also takes into account the 2008 inancial crisis. This study seeks to 
discover that if a irm is inancially constrained and its cash lows are 
highly volatile then it will increase its cash holdings and voluntarily 
reduce its current investment level due to the intertemporal trade-of 
between current and future investments. Thus, a positive relationship 
between cash holdings and future cash low volatility and a negative 
relationship between current investments and future cash low 
volatility is expected. In order to test the impact of cash low volatility 
irms are classiied in to constrained and unconstrained groups on 
the basis of four criteria, i.e., irm size, dividend payment, Kaplan-
Zingales (KZ)  index and group ailiation. For each criterion estimation 
is done by using two steps Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator. Results show that inancially constrained irms increase 
their cash holdings when cash low volatility increases while inancially 
unconstrained irms do not, except for KZ index criteria. It is also found 
that during the 2008 inancial crisis constrained irms were more prone 
to saving cash than unconstrained ones. The study provides important 
insights into understanding the behaviour of Pakistani irms relating 
to cash holdings when they are inancially constrained and cash lows 
are highly volatile. This is the irst study of its kind that establishes a 
conclusive relationship between precautionary cash holdings, cash 
low volatility and inancial constraints in a Pakistani context.
1. Introduction
Keynes (1936) has explained two major beneits of holding cash. First, a irm can save trans-
action cost by using cash to make payments rather than raising fund externally. Second, the 
precautionary motive of holding cash, in which a irm can reserve cash to hedge against 
future cash shortfall. hus, cash holdings can be considered valuable assets of the irm 
when other sources of funds are insuicient to fulil the irm’s demand for capital. his 
situation become more pronounced when irms face external inancing constraints to fund 
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expenditures. In support of this view, several studies reported that irms with greater dii-
culties in obtaining external capital save more cash than irms with fewer frictions (see, for 
example, Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004).
In this study, cash holdings in the developing market is investigated which is diferent in 
governance and institutional framework from the US and UK (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). In cash holding literature there are studies which have pointed out 
that there are signiicant diferences among the cash holding behaviour of developed and 
developing countries (see, for example, Islam & Mozumdar, 2007; Fernandes & Gonenc, 
2014; Kusnadi & Wei, 2011). However, Al-Najjar (2013) observed that there are similarities 
between developed and developing countries on the factors determining cash holdings. 
Investigating this debate in developing markets emphasises the importance of strategic 
decision of cash holding, which has been under-researched in the previous literature.
his study is important in developing country context, such as Pakistan’s, because it is 
considered as having lower level of inancial intermediary development, stock market devel-
opment, legal system ineiciency and lower GDP per capita (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, 
& Maksimovic, 2006). Moreover, irms in Pakistan are characterised as having concentrated 
ownership, family control business groups, pyramidal structures, interlocking directorship 
and cross shareholdings (Cheema, 2003; Zaidi & Aslam, 2005; Javed & Iqbal, 2006). All 
those factors create costly external inancing for irms operating in developing markets. 
However, developed inancial systems can get cheaper external inancing by mitigating the 
market imperfections; this situation leads to more dependency on internally generated funds 
in developing markets (Arslan, Florackis, & Ozkan, 2006). hus, Pakistan is considered as 
a inancially underdeveloped country in which irms face external inancing constraints 
(Khurana, Martin, & Pereira, 2006). Love (2003) also found that inancing constraints, 
measured by the sensitivity of investment to internal funds, decrease with inancial devel-
opment. hus, it implies that irms’ investment policy in developing (developed) markets 
relies more (less) on the availability of internal funds.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) argued that well developed ‘ inancial markets and institutions 
help a irm overcome problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, thus help reducing 
the irm’s cost of raising money from outsiders’ (p. 560). In contrast, these problems become 
severe in countries which are less inancially developed and where institutions are less 
protective of investor interests. his situation creates a wide wedge between irms’ internal 
and external costs of funds (La Porta et al., 1997). Javed and Iqbal (2007) showed that weak 
governance practices afect the external inancing needs of corporations in Pakistan; thus, 
the irms rely more on internal funds for supporting their growth opportunities.
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2005) provided evidence that cash balances secure 
investment through hedging against cash low deicits. hus, it can be argued that inancing 
constraints create a demand for greater liquidity in order to reduce the impact of inancing 
frictions and this need becomes greater in less developed markets (Arslan et al., 2006). 
he above indings have implications for irms in Pakistan because, as the evidence shows, 
Pakistan is not only inancially underdeveloped but its corporate governance systems are 
also not strong enough to protect the rights of investors. hus, making external inance 
costly and encourages irm to save more cash and ease the impact of inancial constraints.
he study also takes into account the impact of the 2008 inancial crisis for Pakistani 
irms. he view that the real economy may sufer from a credit crunch as a result of the 
subprime meltdown is far from self-evident. As Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) carefully 
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document, non-inancial irms held an abundance of cash prior to the crisis. According 
to them:
… the net debt ratio (debt minus cash, divided by assets) exhibits a sharp secular decrease and 
most of this decrease in net debt is explained by the increase in cash holdings. he fall in net 
debt is so dramatic that average net debt for US irms is negative in 2004. In other words, on 
average, irms could have paid of their debt with their cash holdings (p. 1986). 
Given the apparent secular downward trend in cash holdings, the net debt ratio was 
likely even further into negative territory by mid-2007, right before the start of the full-
blown subprime crisis. his at least suggests the possibility of no serious liquidity tightening 
outside the inancial sector. Probably due to of this belief, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
S. Bernanke called strong corporate balance sheets ‘a bright spot in the darkening forecast’ 
during his testimony at the US Congress on monetary policy on 27 February 2008 (Tong 
& Wei, 2009).
Pakistan’s economy is still relatively less integrated with the global economy in compar-
ison to some of its neighbours, such as China and India. he low level of integration kept 
the economy insulated to some extent (Draz, 2011).
According to the 2007–2008 Financial Stability Review from the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP), ‘Pakistan’s banking sector has remained remarkably strong and resilient, despite 
facing pressures emanating from weakening macroeconomic environment since late 2007.’ 
According to Fitch Ratings, the international credit rating agency with head oices in New 
York and London, ‘the Pakistani banking system has, over the last decade, gradually evolved 
from a weak state-owned system to a slightly healthier and active private sector driven sys-
tem’. he data from the banking sector for the inal quarter of 2008 conirms a slowdown 
ater a multi-year growth pattern. In October 2008, total deposits fell from Rs3.77 trillion 
in September to Rs3.67 trillion. Provisions for losses over the same period went up from 
Rs173 billion in September to Rs178.9 billion in October. At the same time, the SBP has 
jacked up interest rates: the three-month Treasury bill auction saw a jump from 9.09% 
in January 2008 to 14% in January 2009, and bank lending rates are now as high as 20%. 
Overall, Pakistan’s banking sector has not been as prone to external shocks as the banks in 
Europe. Liquidity is tight, certainly, but that has little to do with the global inancial crisis 
and more to do with heavy government borrowing from the banking sector, and thus tight 
liquidity and the ‘crowding out’ of the private sector.
he Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is Pakistan’s largest and most liquid exchange. 
BusinessWeek cited it as the ‘best-performing stock market in the world’ for the year 2002. 
On the last trading day in December 2008, the KSE listed a total of 653 companies, with 
an accumulated market capitalisation of Rs1.85 trillion ($23 billion)., he KSE – as repre-
sented by the KSE-100 Index – had its highest close ever on 26 December 2007, at 14,814 
points with a market capitalisation of Rs4.57 trillion ($58 billion). As of 23 January 2009, 
the KSE-100 Index stood at 4929 points with a market capitalisation of Rs1.58 trillion 
($20 billion), a loss of over 65% from its highest point. According to estimates of the SBP, 
foreign investment in the KSE stands at around $500 million. Other estimates put foreign 
investment at around 20% of the total free loat. During the 2006 and 2007 calendar years, 
foreign investors were actively investing in KSE-listed securities. In September 2007, how-
ever, Standard & Poor’s cut its outlook for Pakistan’s credit rating to ‘stable’ from ‘positive’ 
on concerns over deteriorating security. On 5 November 2007, Moody’s Investors Service 
announced that Pakistan’s credit rating had been placed ‘under review’. he end of 2007 
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was a bleak one for the KSE. Uncertainties over the upcoming Pakistani general election, 
a troubling macroeconomic scenario, an active insurgency in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), double-digit inlation, a ballooning trade deicit, an unsustainable 
budgetary deicit and a worrying drop in foreign currency reserves created a dark, threat-
ening cloud over the market.
 he global inancial crisis and the accompanying global credit crunch had only a minor 
direct impact on Pakistan, but the Pakistani economy remains in dire straits. For the 2008–
2009 iscal year, Pakistan needed a colossal $13.4 billion foreign inlow of capital (Saleem, 
2009).
Earlier studies have extensively studied the transaction motive of holding cash. But the 
precautionary motive has not been adequately discussed in the literature (see, for example, 
Han & Qiu, 2007). here are studies which have explained that cash low volatility could 
afect a irm’s cash holding behaviour (see, for example, Mikkelson & Partch, 2003; Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). hese studies suggest that irms use internally gener-
ated funds to hedge against future cash low uncertainty and to increase their cash holdings 
in response to increase in cash low volatility. his is the irst study of its kind which has 
provided a direct analysis of the relationship between cash holdings, cash low uncertainty 
and inancial constraints in the context of Pakistan. Furthermore, it also takes into account 
the impact of the 2008 inancial crisis on Pakistani listed irms.
he present study complements the indings of Han and Qui (2007), which have shown 
that the impact of cash low volatility on a irm’s cash holdings depends upon its inancial 
constraints. A inancially constrained irm increases its cash holdings when there is an 
increase in cash low volatility. While, there is no systematic relationship between cash 
holding and cash low volatility for unconstrained irms. Furthermore, the indings are an 
extension of the results of Opler et al. (1999) and Drobetz and Gruninger (2007) in which 
they reported a positive relationship between volatility and cash holdings. However, they did 
not examine the mediating role of inancing constraints. his study moves a step forward 
by providing the direct relationship between cash low volatility, inancial constraints and 
cash holdings of Pakistani irms in the presence of the 2008 inancial crisis.
2. Related literature and testable hypotheses
Ater the seminal paper of Miller and Modigilliani (1958), much research had objected to 
the substitutability of internal and external inance. he objection was mainly based on 
the notion that there exist imperfections in capital market. When irms face those limi-
tations, they are forced to pay a premium for externally-raised over internally-generated 
funds while, those problems become less severe if a irm has more internal funds available. 
Conventional wisdom says, the more a irm is inancially constrained either in the form 
of capital market terms or internal funds, the less it invests. It is argued that irms which 
are anticipating inancing constraints in the future respond to those potential constraints 
by hoarding cash today. he irst study which addressed the issue of inancing constraints 
of the irm is by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). hey investigated the relationship 
between inancing constraints and corporate investment. hey argued that changes in cash 
low will be an important determinant of marginal capital spending for constrained irms 
when external inancing is costly and sensitivity of investment to cash low will be increasing 
in the degree of inancial constraints.
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Later, Fazzari et al.’s (1988) study was challenged on both an empirical and theoretical 
basis. Kaplan & Zingales (1997)  provided evidence that a greater sensitivity of investment 
to cash low is not a reliable measure of the diferential cost between internal and external 
inance. heir results showed that inancially less-constrained irm’s exhibit signiicantly 
greater investment cash low sensitivity than more inancially constrained irms. Alti (2003) 
further demonstrated that although cash lows contain valuable information about the irm’s 
investment opportunities, the cross-sectional patterns reported by Fazzari et al. (1988) can 
be consistent with the model with no inancing frictions.
Because of certain criticisms associated with the use of investment cash low sensi-
tivities in determining whether costly external inance afects inancial policies. Almeida 
et al. (2004) used a diferent approach; they focus on cash low sensitivity of cash. hey 
explained that since cash is a inancial as opposed to real variable, it is diicult to argue 
that the explanatory power of cash lows over cash policies can be attributed to its ability to 
forecast future business conditions. hey proposed that inancially constrained irms should 
have a systematic propensity to save cash, while unconstrained irms should not. Results 
showed that the cash low sensitivity of cash is positive for constrained irms, but insignii-
cant for unconstrained irms. Pulvino and Tarhan (2005) found that both constrained and 
unconstrained irms have similar positive cash to cash low sensitivity, suggesting no impact 
of inancial constraints. When using a simultaneous equation system and accounting for 
external inancing’s response to cash low changes. Minton and Schrand (1999) documented 
the direct relationship between cash low volatility and investment. hey found that irms 
with high cash low volatility invest less due to the high costs of external inancing.
Almeida et al. (2004) argued that the link between inancial constraints and a irm’s 
demand for liquidity can help identify whether inancial constraints are an important deter-
minant of irm behaviour. hey formalise a model in which irms anticipating inancing 
constraints in the future respond to those constraints by hoarding cash today. Constrained 
irms choose their optimal cash policy by balancing the proitability of current and future 
investment. On the other hand, inancially unconstrained irms have no use of cash, but 
also they bear no cost of holding it. he diference in the cash policies of constrained and 
unconstrained irms suggest that inancial constraints should be related to a irm’s pro-
pensity to save cash out of cash inlows while unconstrained irms should not. hey test 
the model using manufacturing irms over the period 1971–2000. Firms are classiied into 
constrained and unconstrained irms on the basis of ive criteria, i.e., irm payout policy, 
asset size, bond ratings, commercial paper ratings and Kaplan-Zingales index. Consistent 
with the theoretical prediction results showed that constrained irms have signiicantly 
positive cash-cash low sensitivities while unconstrained irms do not. Further, the results 
also showed that inancially constrained irms’ cash low sensitivity of cash increases ater 
negative macroeconomic shock while the unconstrained irms do not.
Based on the theoretical model of Almeida et al. (2004), Han and Qui (2007) determined 
irms’ precautionary cash holdings in response of cash low uncertainty. Results showed 
that inancially constrained irms increase their cash holdings in response to an increase in 
cash low volatility while, inancially unconstrained irms do not. herefore, for irms with 
access to capital markets the precautionary reason for holding cash will not be important.
Paul and Ferrando (2010) investigated the inancial conditions of non-inancial irms 
in Euro area. hey followed the methodology of Almeida et al. (2004) that focuses on the 
analysis of cash low sensitivity of cash holdings. Firms are classiied in to three groups rather 
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than two based on the interrelation of several inancial variables derived from balance sheet 
and proit and loss accounts. he groups are unconstrained irms, relatively constrained 
irms and absolutely constrained irms. Results showed that contrary to the previous evi-
dence based mainly on US irms in Euro area the propensity to save cash out of cash lows 
is signiicantly positive regardless of irms’ inancing conditions.
For a sample of US irms Denis and Sibilkov (2007) further conirmed the results of 
earlier studies that cash holdings are more valuable for inancially constrained irms than 
for unconstrained ones. his is because greater cash holdings are associated with higher 
levels of investment for both constrained and unconstrained irms, but the marginal value 
of investment is greater for constrained irms.
Another stream of literature studied the cross-sectional determinants of cash holdings. 
In those studies it is further conirmed that inancially constrained irms hold more cash 
than unconstrained irms, for example Opler et al. (1999) found that irms with volatile 
cash lows, possess high growth opportunities hold high cash balances. Bates et al. (2009) 
noted the dramatic increase in cash holdings of US industrial irms from 1980–2006. hey 
found that the increase in the industry cash low risk is the main determinant of the increase 
in cash holdings and precautionary motive for cash holdings plays an important role in 
explaining the increase in cash ratios. McVanel and Perevalov (2008) further conirmed 
that for a sample of Canadian irms’ inancial constraints are important in explaining irm’s 
higher cash holdings.
Faulkender and Wang (2006) argued that liquidity is more beneicial for inancially 
constrained irms; thereby the marginal value of cash holdings is more for inancially 
constrained irms than the unconstrained ones. Brown and Petersen (2010) reported that 
irms with inancial constraints are dependent upon cash holdings in order to smooth their 
Research and Development  spending, especially because cash provides a bufer for R&D 
from inancial shocks and the high adjustment costs of R&D.
In a developing country context, Laeven (2003) studied the role of inancial liberalisation 
on easing the inancing constraints (measure by sensitivity of investment to cash low) of 
the irms among developing countries including Pakistan. Results showed that inancial 
liberalisation relaxed the external inancing constraints of small irms but increased the 
inancing constraints of large irms.
Shen and Wang (2005) reported that for a sample of Taiwanese irm investment is less 
sensitive to cash low when a irm has strong bank relationship, here bank relationship is 
used as a proxy for mitigating inancing constraints. hus, a irm held less cash low in hand 
for future investment expenditures while, if a irm has weak bank relationship the investment 
is sensitive to cash lows. In case of Turkey, Arslan et al. (2006) showed that cash holdings 
act as an efective device against cash low luctuations. Its role become more important for 
inancially constrained irms than unconstrained ones especially during the inancial crisis 
period and it also inluences their sensitivity of investment to cash low.
Tong and Wei (2009) proposed a framework to quantify the importance of the inance 
shock to non-inancial irms in 45 countries, including Pakistan. he methodological frame-
work studied the underlying mechanisms by which a inancial sector crisis may afect the 
real sector, and applied it to the case of the global inancial crisis 2008. Results of the study 
showed that countries with rapid pre-crisis credit expansion, inance-sensitive irms expe-
rienced signiicantly worse performance of stocks.
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In case of Pakistan, Sohail and Javid (2014) studied the short term under and overreaction 
efect for Pakistani irms, in the context of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis considering 
the period from September 2007 to 2009. he study indings revealed a consistent pattern 
in relation to prior studies on the subject, relecting absence of any prominent evidence of 
short term under or overreaction efect in the case of the KSE both during and ater the 
inancial crisis events.
On the basis of above arguments following hypothesis are proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Financially constrained irms increase cash holdings in response to increase 
in cash low volatility and during the inancial crisis 2008.
Hypothesis 2: Financially unconstrained irms do not increase cash holdings in response 
to increase in cash low volatility and during inancial crisis 2008.
3. Data and variable measurement
Initially, all Pakistani irms listed on the KSE during the period 2003–2013 are included 
in the sample. However, inancial irms are excluded because they hold liquid assets for 
diferent reasons than non-inancial irms (Drobetz & Gruninger, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, & 
Williamson, 2006). A primary source of data is irms’ annual reports. As a supplementary 
source, ‘Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint Stock Companies Listed on Karachi Stock Exchange’, 
a publication of the SBP and website opendoors.pk is considered. hese sources provide 
information about Balance Sheets, Income Statements and annual reports of all the listed 
non-inancial1 irms of Pakistan. Group/ungroup ailiation of the irms is obtained from the 
book ‘Who Owns Pakistan?’ by Shahid-ur-Rehman (1998) (Ghani & Asharf, 2005; Gohar 
& Karacaer, 2009). In addition, a irm’s market valuation data are also required which is 
taken from brecorder.com.
he information about non-inancial irms is reined, eliminating irms with errors or 
lost values for accounting variables use in the study. he study also removes irms that are 
presumably in inancial distress as denoted by their negative equity igures. If cash and 
cash equivalents exceed the market value of capital, the observation is also removed, since 
the impact of cash holdings is considered extraordinary for these cases (Kim, Mauer, & 
Sherman, 1998). All variables are winsorised the at 1st and 99th percentiles to prevent 
outliers from afecting estimations (Cohen & Li, 2014; Shah, 2011). Ater applying the cor-
responding ilters, a panel comprising 2988 observations of 261 irms is obtained. Panel data 
gives more degrees of freedom and it helps in calculating eicient estimates by controlling 
co-linearity among explanatory variables and also controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 1 outlines the  measurement of explanatory and control variables in the light of 
the discussion in the theoretical framework and literature review section. hese variables 
have been widely used in cash literature.
4. Methodology
In order to test the impact of cash low volatility on inancially constrained and uncon-
strained irms, certain criteria are used which are borrowed from earlier literature. Previous 
literature has suggested a number of measures. Indeed, what constitutes a good measure for 
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inancially constrained irms still undergoes heated debate (see, for example, Fazzari et al., 
1988; Kaplan & Zingles, 1997). Following Alameida et al. (2004) and Arslan et al.’s (2006) 
four indices size, dividend payment, KZ index and business group ailiation are used in 
separating irms in to inancially constrained and unconstrained groups.
4.1. Firm size
Firm size is the irst criteria used in the study for separating irms into inancially con-
strained and unconstrained groups over the sample period 2003–2013. Firms are assigned 
to inancially constrained (unconstrained) group if they are in the bottom (top) quartile 
of size distribution. his ranking is based on annual basis. Firm size is used as criteria for 
inancially constrained and unconstrained irms because it is argued that it is more diicult 
for smaller irms to obtain external inancing as they are less known, young and having less 
ix assets to be used as collateral as compare to lager irms (Almaida et al., 2004; Luo, 2011).
4.2.  Dividend payment
Dividend payment is the second criteria used in the study. For each year irms which pay 
dividend are assigned to unconstrained group and those which do not pay dividend are 
considered as constrained irms (Han & Qiu, 2007). his criterion is used because it is found 
in literature that inancially unconstrained irms are more likely to pay higher dividends as 
compared to constrained irms (Almaida et al., 2004; Frésard & Frochaux, 2004).
4.3.  KZ Index
Rather than using constraint proxies based on single irm characteristics, a multidimen-
sional measure is used developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). hey showed that the 
likelihood of a irm to be inancially constrained is collectively determined by proitability, 
growth opportunity, leverage ratio and cash holdings. Following Almaida et al. (2004) and 
Luo (2011) irms are grouped in to inancially constrained and unconstrained irms using 
following equation.
Firms in the bottom (top) quartiles are ranked as inancially unconstrained (constrained) 
and this ranking is done on annual basis.
4.4.  Business group ailiation
Following Arslan et al. (2006) fourth criterion is group ailiation in which irms are assigned 
to inancially unconstrained (constrained) groups if they belong to (do not belong) to 
another corporation. It is argued that business group ailiations are eicient economic 
arrangements that substitute for missing or ineicient outside institutions and markets 
(Ghani & Asharf (2005) ) that is why irms which are ailiated with business groups are 
considered as unconstrained. his criterion is important especially in Pakistan because of 
the prevalence of family owned business groups (Cheema, 2003).
(1)KZ index = − 1.002
∗CF + .283∗TQ + 3.139∗L − 39.368∗Dividends − 1.315∗Cash
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Firms are classiied in to constrained and unconstrained groups on the basis of above 
criterias. Following Han and Qui (2007) a dynamic panel cash holdings model is developed. 
his model is used in estimating the relationship between cash holdings and cash low vola-
tility for constrained and unconstrained groups of irm. he Hansen test is also applied for 
over identifying restrictions to investigate whether or not there exist a correlation between 





 is the dependent variable of irm i at time t. Among independent variables 















 which is lagged value of 
dependent variable . Crisis is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the year 
2007 and 2008 and 0 otherwise. measures unobservable heterogeneity and is the error term.
5. Empirical results
Table 2 shows the Pearson correlation coeicients for alternative measures of inancial con-
straints used in the study. All correlation coeicients are positive and signiicant except for 
the correlation between KZ index with size and dividend payment. Almaida et al. (2004) 
also used the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index as inancial constraints index and ind that 
KZ index is negatively correlated with other indices. Correlation coeicients are signiicant 
but they are not high enough to cause the multicollinearity problem.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables use in study. he table reports 
the mean, median, standard deviation and quartiles for each variable. Results showed that 
on average the sample irms hold 15.3% of their assets in the form of cash and cash equiva-
lents with the median of 4.5%. he mean cash ratio found here is very much closer to other 
related studies (see for example, Afza & Adnan, 2007; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004 and Opler 
et al., 1999). he average size of the sample irm is 6.439. his shows that irms are bigger 
in terms of their assets but they do not have high growth opportunities as shown by their 
average Tobin’s Q ratio, i.e., 1.234.
(2)
Cashit = 훽0 + 훽1CVCFi,t−1 + 훽2CFi,t + 훽3Sizei,t−1 + 훽4TQi,t−1 + 훽5Li,t−1 + 훽6Cashi.t−1
+ 훽
7
Crisis + 휂i + 휀it
Table 1. names and measurement of the variables.
Name of Variables Denoted by Measured by
cash cash Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to net assets.
cash Flow volatility cvcF it is measured as coeicient of variation of the irm’s yearly cash low of 
past four years.
cash Flow cF Ratio of cash low to net assets.
Leverage L Ratio of total debt to net assets
size siZE natural logarithm of irm’s asset. 
Growth opportunities tQ Ratio of market value of equity plus book value of debt to net assets.
crisis cRisis Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the year 2007 and 2008 and 
zero otherwise. 
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Table 2. correlation matrix.
notes: the table provides correlation among diferent Financial constraint criteria. these criteria are used to divide irms 
into constraint and unconstraint groups. P-values are reported in parenthesis, where ***, **, * indicate coeicients signif-
icance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
source: authors’ calculations.




kZ index −0.102 −0.312 1
(0.03)** (0.04)**
Group ailiation 0.036 0.010 0.05 1
(0.05)** (.311) (0.621)
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
notes: the table provides descriptive statistics of variables used in the study. the variables are cash measure as cash and 
cash equivalents to net assets (cashi,t), cash Flow volatility measure as coeicient of variation of the irm’s yearly cash low 
of past four years (cvcFi,t), cash Flow measure as operating income before depreciation normalised by net of assets (cFi,t), 
size measure as natural log of total assets (sizei,t), tobin’s Q measure as a ratio of market value of equity plus the book 
value of debt to total assets (tqi,t) and leverage which is measure as ratio of debt to total assets (Li,t).
source: authors’ calculations.
Variables Mean Std 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
cashi.t 0.153 0.512 0.007 0.045 0.126
cvcFi.t 3.245 45.649 0.341 0.363 1.329
cFi,t 0.1553 0.512 0.032 0.126 0.084
sizei,t 6.439 1.332 5.297 6.290 7.342
tqi,t 1.234 0.503 0.892 0.959 1.394
Li,t 0.512 0.310 0.259 0.356 0.635
Table 4. cash low volatility and cash holdings.
notes: the table provides the estimation output of the model used in the study performed through Gmm. here cash (cashit) 
is the dependent variable. independent variables include cash low volatility (cvcFi,t-1), cash low (cFi,t),size (sizei,t-1), 
tobin’s Q (tQi,t-1), lagged value of cash and crisis dummy which takes the value of 1 for 2007–2008 and 0 otherwise. this 
model is applied when irms are classiied into constrained/unconstrained groups on the basis of four Financial constraint 
criteria, i.e., size, Dividend, kZ index, Group ailiation. hensen test of over identifying restriction is implied with null hy-
pothesis of instrument validity. P-values are reported in parenthesis.
source: authors’ calculations.
Financial Constraints Criteria

























 cvcFi,t-1 −0.013 0.016 −0.139 0.0005 0.001 0.042 0.027 0.0014
(0.863) (0.026) (0.294) (0.035) (0.329) (0.384) (0.279) (0.032)
 cFi,t 0.054 0.005 4.335 0.0017 0.563 −0.432 0.175 0.118
(0.032) (0.028) (0.082) (0.024) (0.258) (0.338) (0.035) (0.056)
 sizei,t-1 0.251 0.6535 −1.132 −0.182 0.232 −0.028 0.216 −0.032
(0.341) (0.217) (0.339) (0.212) (0.718) (0.755) (0.366) (0.721)
 tQi,t-1 −0.346 0.025 0.581 0.075 0.286 0.388 −0.225 −0.433
(0.225) (0.537) (0.352) (0.511) (0.717) (0.804) (0.352) (0.043)
Li,t-1 2.813 −0.276 3.443 −0.156 0.216 0.035 0.354 −0.632
(0.052) (0.084) (0.237) (0.271) (0.475) (0.652) (0.032) (0.354)
 cashi,t-1 0.031 0.325 0.075 0.563 0.252 0.239 0.156 0.529
(0.056) (0.035) (0.752) (0.023) (0.832) (0.426) (0.363) (0.042)
cRisis 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.34 0.25 .28 .38 .34
(.06) (.026) (.075) (.036) (.132) (.09) (.293) (.013)
hansen test 
(df )
7.134(13) 6.515(18) 2.683(15) 10.709(20) 6.090(16) 6.215(15) 4.129(15) 5.075(16)
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Table 4 presents the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation results of 
dynamic penal regression models for inancially constrained and unconstrained irms used 
in the study. In equation 2 the main variable of interest is cash low volatility of cash hold-
ings, rest of the variables are control variables which are conventional and have been found 
in literature to have signiicant explanatory power on the cash holding decisions of irms 
(Almaida et al., 2004; Martinez-carrascel, 2010). Most of the coeicients have expected 
signs for all the four constrained/ unconstrained criteria’s.
Consistent with the results of Han and Qui (2007), McVanel and Perevalov (2008) and 
Martinez-carrascel, (2010) it is found that cash low volatility is signiicantly positively 
related with cash holdings of inancially constrained irms in Pakistan while for uncon-
strained irms the relationship is insigniicant. his relationship supports the precautionary 
motive of holding cash for constrained irms. Furthermore, the positive link between cash 
holdings and cash low volatility of irms with limited access to external inance indicates a 
negative relationship between current investment and cash low volatility for inancially con-
strained irms than unconstrained irms. hese results explain that inancially constrained 
irms save cash today in order to fund future investment opportunities. But, saving cash 
today may cause the irm to forgo current positive net present value projects, which may 
prove costly. hus, inancially constrained irms will achieve an optimal cash policy that 
trades of current investments against proitable future investments. On the other hand, 
inancially unconstrained irms do not have any cost for holding cash because no current 
period investments are let and they derive less beneit from holding cash (Almaida et al., 
2004).
Results also show positive and signiicant relationship between cash holdings and cash 
lows. his relationship is consistent with the argument that irms save cash out of cash 
lows to inance future investments because of a wedge between internal and external cost 
of funds (Khurana et al., 2006). he coeicient on the lagged dependent variable is less than 
unity and statistically signiicant, indicating stationarity and persistence in cash holdings 
(Martinez-Carrascal, 2010; Sher, 2014). he result on KZ index is puzzling and does not 
conirm the hypothesis. Almaida et al. (2004) also reported similar results for KZ index and 
they point the contradictory inding to the fact that KZ index may not be a good measure 
of inancial constraints. Crisis variable is also signiicantly positive for constrained irms 
in all the four criteria and for unconstrained irms it was signiicant when the inancial 
constraint was size and dividend payment. his inding shows that during inancial crisis 
2008 constrained irms save more cash than the unconstrained ones. In some cases, uncon-
strained irms also save cash but the signiicance is low as compared to constrained irms. 
his result is consistent with the indings of Arslan et al. (2006) for a sample of Turkish irms. 
his inding explains that cash reserves of irms can be used efectively as a hedging device 
against the luctuations in cash low and inancial constraints, which restrict the ability of 
irms to undertake proitable investment opportunities and cash stands as an efective device 
for irms mainly, during the crisis period.
For all regression speciications, Hansen (1982) chi-square test statistic showed that for 
the null hypothesis the model’s over identifying restrictions are valid, i.e., the estimated 
orthogonality conditions are suiciently close to zero.
Overall, it can be said that results support the hypothesis. Cash low volatility is signii-
cantly and positively related with cash holdings of inancially constrained Pakistani irms. 
However, it is insigniicant for inancially unconstrained irms.
12   Q. AZMAT AND A. M. IQBAL
Financial lexibility is considered as the most important goal of irms’ inancial policy. 
hese policies made sure that funding for present and future investments are available in 
a world where contracting and information frictions are present. hese frictions afect 
the marginal costs and beneits of various projects depending on irm’s inancial position. 
Managers not only react to inancing frictions when they occur, but they also anticipate 
future frictions and adjust the irms’ policies accordingly so that the impact of these frictions 
is minimised (Almaida et al., 2011).
Khurana et al. (2006) in their cross-country study showed that the sensitivity of cash 
holdings to cash lows decreases with inancial development. heir sample includes Pakistan 
and on the basis of diferent criteria Pakistan is considered as inancially underdeveloped. 
Result of the study showed that the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash lows decreases 
with inancial development. hus, it can be implied from the results of current study that 
inancially constrained and unconstrained irms in Pakistan show signiicant diferences in 
their cash holding policies. Cash holding policies of constrained irms are more conditioned 
on the cash low volatility while for unconstrained irms no such relationship holds (like 
Almaida et al., 2004 and Han & Qiu, 2007).
6. Conclusion
his empirical chapter examines the relationship between inancial constraints, cash hold-
ings and cash low volatility in the presence of inancial crisis 2008. Following Han and Qui 
(2007) a positive relationship is expected between cash holdings and cash low volatility of 
inancially constrained irms while no such relationship is expected for unconstrained irms.
Firms are divided into constrained and unconstrained groups on the basis of four crite-
ria, i.e., dividend payment, KZ index, irm size and group ailiation. Results showed that 
inancially constrained irms increase their cash holdings when cash low volatility increases 
while unconstrained irms do not. he study delivers important insights in to understanding 
the cash related behaviour of irms in developing country context like Pakistan.
he existing literature has a debate about the appropriate relationship between invest-
ment-cash low sensitivity of a irm and inancial constraints. On one hand, Fazzari et al. 
(1988) argued that investment to cash low sensitivity is high for inancially constrained 
irms than the unconstrained ones. On the other hand, Kaplan et al. (1997) pointed out 
that inancially unconstrained irm’s exhibit greater investment cash low sensitivity than 
constrained irms. Overall, the evidence in this study shows that inancially constrained 
irms increase their cash holdings when cash low volatility increases while unconstrained 
irms do not. As such, this study contributes in two distinct areas. First, the study adds to 
the literature on cash holdings, more speciically its importance for irms in less developed 
countries like Pakistan. In Pakistan, external inance is not easily available due to less inan-
cial development and weak law enforcement bodies. his situation makes present study 
more valuable for Pakistan because it speciically focuses on constrained irms which are 
in need of cash due to volatile cash lows and high growth opportunities. Second, the study 
adds to the literature related to corporate saving behaviour of cash holdings. Prior litera-
ture suggested that irms increase their cash holdings in response to increase in cash low 
volatility (see, for example, Opler et al., 1999). his is the irst study of its kind which has 
provided a direct analysis of the relationship between cash holdings, cash low uncertainty 
and inancial constraints during the crisis period of 2008 in the context of Pakistan. he 
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results of the study also contribute to irm’s investment decisions by describing that degrees 
of inancial constraints and cash low volatility afect the investment decisions of the irm. 
As such these results substantiate the recent indings which document that irms with high 
cash low volatility invest less due to the high costs of external inancing (see, for example, 
Acharya et al., 2005; Minton & Schrand, 1999). he evidence provided in this study is 
based on the analysis of irms in Pakistan. Such an analysis will also allow in investigating 
the inluence of country speciic characteristics on cash holding and potential interactions 
between these characteristics and irm speciic ones.
Note
1.  Sample irms include non-inancial irms comprising of manufacturing, non-inancial services 
and retail irms listed on the KSE  during the period 2003–2013. Financial irms including 
banks, insurance, real estate and trading irms are excluded from the sample because their cash 
holdings may be subject to extraneous inluences, such as government regulations (Faleye, 
2004).
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